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Implications of Recent Developments in Ireland
for the Status of the Embryo
SHEELAGH McGUINNESS and SORCHA UI´ CHONNACHTAIGH
One of the most significant developments in the area of reproductive health in
Ireland is the Roche v. Roche [2009] case.1 The case concerned a woman who
wished to implant cryopreserved embryos made with a former partner, against
the partner’s wishes. Of particular interest are questions about the status of the
embryo: in Ireland the life of ‘‘the unborn’’ is constitutionally protected.2
Therefore the courts in Roche had to decide whether embryos were ‘‘unborn’’
within the meaning of the Irish Constitution. Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution
states:
The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due
regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to
respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate
that right.
The absence of any clarificatory legislation on abortion3 and the lack of regulation
in the area of assisted human reproduction (AHR) created room for broad
interpretation of the constitutional provision, which is seen by many, including
most of the judges in the case, as a ban on abortion.4 Mary Roche (MR), the
applicant in Roche, claimed not only that her estranged husband could not refuse
his consent to implantation of the embryos (and responsibility for any resulting
children) but that the constitution conferred a right to life on the frozen embryos,
in which case the husband’s consent would have been irrelevant in many
respects. If the courts had found that Article 40.3.3 did apply to in vitro embryos,
thus giving them a right to life, there would have been serious implications for
the legal permissibility of many AHR techniques and practices, something that
was acknowledged by Gerard Hogan, Senior Counsel for MR.5 The Supreme
Court’s interpretation of ‘‘unborn’’ would also have had broader implications for
abortion, post-coital (emergency) contraception, and embryo research.
In this paper we examine the ruling in Roche, which is a landmark decision in
the Irish bioethical landscape. In Ireland, the centrality of the Constitution means
that bioethical issues are often considered within the constitutional law para-
digm. We do not address the substance of the consent arguments in this case;
rather we focus on the constitutional law questions raised in Roche and
the particularities of the Irish context. We argue that the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of Article 40.3.3 relies on a distinction between moral and legal
status and that in Ireland ‘‘legal’’ status depends on implantation of the embryo
in the ‘‘maternal organism.’’ The paper concludes with some thoughts on the
possible implications of the decision in Roche for bioethics in Ireland.
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The Case
The plaintiff and defendant married in 1992. In 2001, they were referred for
infertility treatment at the Sims Clinic in Rathgar, Dublin.6 During the course of
their visit to the clinic the plaintiff signed a form entitled ‘‘Consent to Treatment
Involving Egg Retrieval.’’ This recorded her consent to the removal of eggs and
the mixing of these eggs with the defendant’s sperm. Similarly, the defendant
signed a form entitled ‘‘Husband’s Consent.’’ Here he acknowledged that he was
the plaintiff’s husband and consented to ‘‘the course of treatment outlined
above,’’ and that he was the legal father of any resulting children from the
treatment. They both signed a form entitled ‘‘Consent to Embryo Freezing.’’ In
signing this, they agreed to the cryopreservation of their embryos and agreed to
take ongoing responsibility for them. Finally the defendant signed a form entitled
‘‘Consent to Embryo Transfer’’ giving his consent to the placing of three embryos
in the plaintiff’s uterus. In the course of treatment, six embryos were created,
three of which were implanted and three of which were frozen. The treatment
was successful and the plaintiff gave birth to a girl in October 2002. However,
during the pregnancy, the marital relationship broke down, attempts at recon-
ciliation failed, and the couple separated but remained legally married.
A dispute arose over the remaining frozen embryos. The plaintiff wished to
have them transferred into her uterus for the purposes of achieving a pregnancy.
The defendant, who did not wish for this to happen, said that his consent did not
cover the situation that had arisen and that it would be unreasonable to expect
him to father a child in such circumstances. The plaintiff contested that the
defendant’s earlior consent covered this situation. She initiated proceedings to
have the embryos returned to her for implantation. In her statement of claim, she
also argued that, in accordance with article 40.3.3, she was entitled to vindicate
the right to life of the three embryos.
The case was first heard by Mr. Justice McGovern, in the High Court, who ruled
that the first issue to be decided was the civil law issue of consent. He said that this
was separate from the public law issue of the embryos’ ‘‘right to life,’’ and thus
delivered two rulings. The first was delivered in July 2006 and considered whether
the consent given by the defendant covered the circumstances that had arisen.
McGovern J. criticized the clinic’s consent procedures. He said the forms were
vague and unclear. He also stated that the issue of what would happen to the
embryos if the circumstances of the couple changed, either through death or
separation, should have been raised.7 He ruled that there was no evidence that the
defendant had given his explicit consent to the implantation of the remaining three
embryos. He further found that there was no implied consent on the defendant’s
part and that he had not ‘‘entered into an agreement which requires him to give his
consent to the implantation of the three frozen embryos in the plaintiff’s uterus.’’8 In
his second ruling, McGovern J. addressed the question of whether for the purposes
of Article 40.3.3 of the Irish Constitution the embryos could be regarded as unborn.
If they were regarded as unborn, then the plaintiff could bring a claim to the courts
on their behalf, to vindicate their right to life. The plaintiff also brought a claim
under Article 41 of the Constitution, Respect for Private and Family Life. This claim
also depended on whether the embryos could be considered unborn for the
purposes of the Constitution. McGovern J. rejected the plaintiff’s claim that in vitro
embryos had a constitutional right to life, and so these subsequent claims failed.
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The case was appealed on 14 grounds to the Supreme Court and heard by Chief
Justice Murray and Denham, Hardiman, Geoghegan, and Fennelly, JJ. We identify
a number of core themes within the judgments that we discuss here with reference
to the relevant aspects of the broader policy context in Ireland. This case highlights
issues that arise when courts are faced with the ambiguous nature of the embryo’s
status and the uncertainty many feel about distinguishing questions of when life
begins to matter morally and when life acquires the protection of the law.
A theme running through all the judgments is the difficulty resulting from
varying accounts given in evidence of what the embryo is andwhether it hasmoral
status, human features, and so forth. The judges highlighted the difficulty for
a court when deciding questions of when life begins to matter morally. Murray CJ.
andDenham J. rejected thenotion that the constitutional provisionneeds to concern
itself with questions of when life begins. Rather they focused on defining the
provision as being concerned with life prior to birth. Murray CJ. stated:
The status of the embryo, that is to say its moral status, and specifically
the issue as to when human life begins, continues to be debated and
discussed as part of a virtually world wide discourse . . . [t]he many
facets of the various sides to that debate, and there are cogent arguments
from every perspective, is manifest from the evidence given by the
expert witnesses in the High Court.
. . .
The moral status of embryos and the respect or protection which society
may feel they are owed is a different issue to the question posed, as to
when life begins, and I do not propose to comment on it further for the
purposes of this judgment.
The Court was keen to clarify the distinction between moral and legal questions.
It held that it is not for the Court to consider when life begins but rather when it
starts to be protected by law, that is, to focus on clarifying the legal status of the
embryo while acknowledging that this may or may not align with moral status.
The question is whether or not the frozen embryos are protected by law.9 Brazier
suggests that this approach to decisionmaking is evidenced in many medico-legal
cases; where possible, ‘‘judges elegantly sidestep as many knotty moral problems
as they can.’’10 Of course, such an approach itself assumes a certain moral
position, that there is a difference between questions of law and questions of
morality, a point that has been criticized by those who emphasize the natural law
foundations of the Irish Constitution.11 Nevertheless, the Courts instead define
their task, in the absence of legislation, as a policy question.
Background to Article 40.3.3
At this point some background to the contested provision of the Constitution
may be helpful. In 1983 the government held a referendum that led to the insertion
of Article 40.3.3 into the Irish Constitution. The Article was the eighth amendment
to the Irish Constitution and in 1983 abortion was prohibited by The Offences
against the Person Act 1861.12 The introduction in the United Kingdom of the
Abortion Act 1967 and the U.S. case of Roe v. Wade created a fear among some
groups that similar liberalization of abortion law in Ireland might occur.13 Many
commentators therefore suggest that 40.3.3 is best understood as a strengthening of
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the prohibition on abortion, and it is this position that the majority of the judges in
Roche took.
One of the main cases relied on was the seminal ruling in The Attorney General v. X
& Ors (X).14 This case took place in 1992 and is the leading authority on the
interpretation of Article 40.3.3. It concerned a young girl, X, who was pregnant as
a result of rape.15 X’s parents wished to take her abroad for an abortion but sought
advice from the police about whether tissue from the fetus could be used as
evidence against the alleged rapist who was known to the family. The police referred
the case to the Attorney General, and the question arose as to whether X could be
prevented from traveling to England for the purposes of having an abortion given
the constitutional protection afforded to the unborn. The case relied explicitly on the
relationship between the unborn and the pregnant woman, which is evident from
the following quotations:
The creation of a new life, involving as it does pregnancy, birth and raising
the child, necessarily involves some restriction of a mother’s freedom but
the alternative is the destruction of the unborn life. The termination of
pregnancy is not like a visit to the doctor to cure an illness. The State must,
in principle, act in accordance with the mother’s duty to carry out the
pregnancy and, in principle must also outlaw termination of pregnancy.16
The case also made the following pronouncement on how Article 40.3.3 should
be interpreted:
Its purpose can be readily identified—it was to enshrine in the
Constitution the protection of the right to life of the unborn thus
precluding the legislature from an unqualified repeal of s.58 of the Act
of 1861 or otherwise, in general, legalising [sic] abortion.17
This is a very narrow interpretation and essentially states that the purpose of
Article 40.3.3 should only be understood as directly preventing any chance of
abortion being legalized in the State.18 From the above statement strength can be
taken for the argument that it is through implantation that the ‘‘unborn’’ (the
embryo) achieves protection. This is something that was recommended in 2005
by the Irish Commission on Assisted Human Reproduction, which will be
discussed in more detail below. The special relationship between the pregnant
woman and the fetus, according to this analysis, gives rise to fetal protection; this
turns on its head the usual arguments regarding the justifiability of abortion on
the grounds of respecting the physical integrity of the pregnant woman.
The connection between Article 40.3.3 and abortion led the majority of the
Supreme Court to conclude that although the ‘‘unborn’’ could be equated with
the in utero embryo, the in vitro embryo does not come within 40.3.3 for the
purposes of acquiring the protection of the law. It was also argued that there is no
evidence that the in vitro embryo was in the minds of the people voting in the
referendum on Article 40.3.3.19
Lack of Regulation in Ireland
This was not the first time the question of whether embryos were constitutionally
protected by 40.3.3 was raised. When Article 40.3.3 was being drafted the Seanad,
which is the upper house of the Irish Parliament, defeated a proposal that defined
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the unborn as excluding ‘‘the fertilised ovum prior to the time at which such
fertilised ovum becomes implanted in the wall of the uterus.’’20 This was
overlooked by all of the judges in Roche. Instead they preferred a test of the
minds of the people as they voted over parliamentary intention, which is
discussed further later in the paper. In 2002, in the wake of the decision in X,
there were calls to further restrict possibilities for legal abortions within the State.
A further amendment to the Constitution, which would restrict access to abortion
to cases where the life, as opposed to the health, of the pregnant woman was at
risk was proposed.21 Again during these debates the question of whether
embryos should be considered to fall within the protection of 40.3.3 was
considered.22 More recently the Commission on Assisted Human Reproduction
(CAHR) addressed this point and came to the view that the ex utero embryo is
not deserving of constitutional protection.23 The CAHR was established by the
Minister for Health and Children amid growing public concern over the lack of
regulation in the broad area of AHR in Ireland.24 The Report of the CAHR in 2005
made 40 recommendations, many of which, if acted upon, may have precluded
MR from progressing to the courts at all. The Irish Medical Council had
previously prohibited registered medical practitioners from deliberately destroy-
ing embryos25 but more recent editions of the Council’s ethical guidelines are not
as proscriptive.26 This view was also endorsed by the Irish Council for Bioethics
in their 2008 report on embryonic stem cell research.27 Several of the judges
acknowledged and made reference to the CAHR Report and called for this area
to be regulated and considered by parliament.28 Many also referenced the
Constitutional Review Group Report in 1996, which stated that a
definition is needed as to when the ‘‘unborn’’ acquires the protection
of the law. Philosophers and scientists may continue to debate
when human life begins but the law must define what it intends to
protect.29
They further expressed serious dissatisfaction with the lack of guidance re-
garding the meaning of the ‘‘unborn.’’
The regulatory context, more precisely the absence of any regulation or
legislation in the area of AHR, generated an opportunity to test the constitutional
provision that protects the right to life of the ‘‘unborn.’’ This absence of
regulation was sharply criticized by several of the Supreme Court judges.
Denham J. (s.46) pointed out that it is not for the court to make decisions about
‘‘the imponderables relating to the concept of life,’’ which is the remit of science,
theology, and ethics. It was the Supreme Court’s responsibility to interpret the
Constitution, on points of law alone.30 Murray CJ. pointed out that it is the re-
sponsibility of the legislature to decide controversial issues, such as the begin-
ning of human life:
I do not consider that it is for a court of law, faced with the most
divergent if most learned views in the discourses available to it from the
disciplines referred to, to pronounce on the truth of when precisely
human life begins. Absent a broad consensus or understanding on that
truth, it is for legislatures in the exercise of their dispositive powers to
resolve such issues on the basis of policy choices.31
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Hardiman J. further emphasized that it is not for the courts to adjudicate on matters
concerning the beginning of life. He warned that Ireland risks becoming a default
unregulated jurisdiction for controversial practices in the absence of regulation.32 He
criticized the patent ‘‘reluctance’’ of the legislature to act on its obligation to consider
the admittedly complex and difficult issues raised by the in vitro embryo as to
when life begins. Hardiman J. also drew attention to the call for legislation by
McCarthy J. in the X case in 1992. In regard to the absence of abortion legislation,
McCarthy J. stated, ‘‘[t]he failure of the Legislature to enact the appropriate
legislation is no longer just unfortunate; it is inexcusable.’’33 Geoghegan J. referred
to the Report of the government-appointed CAHR in 2005 as an example of proper
consideration of the issues at hand. With regard to this report, Fennelly J. stated: ‘‘It
is disturbing, to use no stronger word, that some four years after publication of the
Report of the Commission on Assisted Human Reproduction, no legislative
proposal has even been formulated.’’34 The political inertia of the government
on abortion and assisted reproduction was particularly vexing for the Supreme
Court given the persistent calls from the High Court, civil society groups,35 and
government committees.36
McGovern J., in the High Court, stated that he would interpret the Constitution
in accordance with its main principles but also with due regard to the intentions
of the voters when Article 40.3.3 was inserted into the Constitution. He stated
that constitutional principles could change over time and were not set in stone.
However, he took a definite approach to understanding the intentions of the
population in 1983, stating:
They are not, in my view, authority for the proposition that the word
‘‘unborn’’ in Article 40.3.3 should be given a different meaning to that
which was understood by the people at the time when they approved
the amendment, if it can be ascertained, from the historical context, what
the word was understood to mean.37
McGovern J. looked to other sources in Irish law to find a way of defining the
‘‘unborn.’’ These included section 58 of the Civil Liability Act 1961, which states:
For the avoidance of doubt it is hereby declared that the law relating to
wrongs shall apply to an unborn child for his protection in like manner
as if the child were born, provided the child is subsequently born alive
[emphasis added].38
The Act is primarily concerned with the ‘‘unborn’’ as it exists in utero, although it is
open to the possibility that in vitro damage may lead to a resultant child bringing
a successful claim. This piece of legislation has as a condition the possibility that the
child subsequently be born alive. Denham J. picked up on this line of reasoning and
spent much time analyzing the contingent nature of Article 40.3.3. She believed that
the amendment relies on the implantation of the embryo because
[t]he unborn is considered in Article 40.3.3° in relation to the mother.
The special relationship is acknowledged. Of course there is a relation-
ship between the frozen embryos in the clinic and the mother and the
father–but not the link and relationship envisaged in Article 40.3.3°.
Article 40.3.3° was drafted in light of the special relationship that exists
uniquely between a mother and the child she carries. It is when this
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relationship exists that Article 40.3.3° applies. . . . The beginning of
‘‘life’’ is not the protected term, it is the unborn, the life capable of
being born, which is protected. The capacity to be born, or birth,
defines the right protected. This situation, the capacity to be born,
arises after implantation.39
It seems uncontroversial to define ‘‘unborn’’ as that which has the capacity to be
born but the implications of the conditions upon which that capacity relies are
more divisive. Further arguments were presented to the Court that stated that
where there was doubt as to the meaning of ‘‘unborn’’ the courts should come
down on the side of life, but this is something that the Courts rejected. Some of
the judges, however, stated that uncertainty may lead to the embryo being treated
with special respect and that the creation of embryos gives rise to ‘‘serious moral
and ethical issues which themselves impose restraints on what may or may not
be done to them.’’40 The Court also draws from previous judgments that dealt
with the definition of ‘‘the unborn’’ showing that they all focused on the
‘‘unborn’’ as an entity which can be found in utero. (This may be unsurprising
given that assisted reproductive technologies have only relatively recently
become available in the State.)
Legal and Moral Status
Drawing from the arguments presented in Roche, this section briefly examines
the distinction between the function of moral and legal status. The uncertainty
surrounding the constitutional status of embryos led Murray CJ. to conclude
that
[t]he courts do not, in my view, have at their disposal objective criteria to
decide this as a justiciable issue. Issues are not justiciable before the
courts where there is, as Brennan J. put it in his opinion in Baker v. Carr
369 U.S. 186 (1962), ‘‘a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non judicial discretion.’’
That is the position in which the Court in this case is placed regarding
the question of when life begins. The onus rests on the Oireachtas to
make the initial policy determination so as to define by law the precise
point at which ‘‘the life of the unborn’’ begins to enjoy constitutional
protection. The other alternative is an amendment to the Constitution.41
As the court acknowledged, the question of when life begins is an issue fraught
with metaphysical difficulty. Our view of when life begins will be colored by our
moral opinions, religious beliefs, and the society we are born into. Moral status
should be based on nonarbitrary criteria and should relate to intrinsic properties.42
Legal status, as a concept, is not like this. It is an externally granted property. The
law defines what falls within its protection, and once something has legal
protection, it has legal status. Legal status can also come in degrees and seems
to have more possibilities for accommodating the symbolic values of various
entities, for example, the flag. It is to this that the judges were pointing when they
considered the distinction between moral accounts of when life begins and legal
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accounts of when life acquires protection. We may define something’s having legal
status in an arbitrary fashion. Arbitrariness is not necessarily illegitimate in this
context, although it may be. For instance, the decision to set the speed limit at 40
may be based on a legitimate arbitrary cutoff between 35 and 45.
However, the decision to protect the human life from birth may be considered
arbitrary in a way that is not subject to moral justification. Consider the following
objection to the High Court decision in MR:
Father Vincent Twomey, Professor Emeritus of Moral theology at
St. Patrick’s College, Maynooth . . . stated that the decision was based
on a distinction that was without scientific basis.43
His argument is as follows:
Current scientific knowledge underwrites the equal biological status of
all human pre-implantation embryos irrespective of their origin or
location. The full potential of such embryos, whether produced in the
laboratory or through natural conception is identical: given the oppor-
tunity, both groups will, with varying degrees of success, continue to
develop in the womb.44
This argument can be drawn out on a number of points. The first of these is the
normativity given by Father Twomey to the scientific description of the embryos.
As Szawarski describes:
If we accept that no moral conclusion can be deduced from empirical or
metaphysical statements alone, then whatever the empirical (or meta-
physical) arguments brought into debate to endorse a moral position it
can never be conclusive reason. It is always what C.L. Stevenson would
call a ‘‘supporting reason’’ only.45
The fact that embryos in utero and in vitro are biologically the same does not
mean that they ought to be treated the same, either morally or legally. This is
because, although biologically the same, there is much to distinguish the two, for
example, their relationship with their surroundings and also their capacity given
their surroundings. Legally it seems quite reasonable to grant protection to in
utero embryos but not to in vitro embryos. In the same way, the law protects born
alive babies in a way it does not protect biologically identical in utero fetuses.
This is true of the law in many jurisdictions, including Ireland, where,
notwithstanding 40.3.3, the killing of the fetus in utero is not considered murder.
Morally, if we take potentiality to be the basis for our respect of the embryo (and
this seems to be at least part of the meaning of ‘‘unborn’’), the potentiality of the
two entities is not identical.46 Rather it is following implantation that an
embryo has the potentiality that Father Twomey describes—the embryo in
utero and the uterine environment give true potentiality for life. The in vitro
embryo does not in itself have the same potentiality given its less hospitable
surroundings. This reasoning can be seen as underpinning the importance
placed on implantation and providing a reason why, in Ireland, the embryo is
reliant on an attachment to the pregnant woman for constitutional protection.
Most significantly, it is at the point of implantation that the unborn acquires
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a negative right against hostile interference; the in vitro embryo would need
a positive right to be implanted.
Following the Court in Roche, we consider the argument that legal persons are
those entities that the law defines as its subjects and differ from persons in the
moral sense, even though there may be a correlation between moral arguments
and legal positions adopted. There is a long-running debate between legal
positivists and natural law theorists on this very question.
The function of moral status is a different question from that of the function of
law. Warren suggests that moral status may function in two ways. It may imply
moral minimums, that is, moral status may set a minimum standard for how we
act toward each other.47 Or it may imply moral ideals, that is, it may give rise to
ideals in the standards of how we act toward each other. Legal status guarantees
an entity certain legal protections and may not exactly correlate with moral
status. An entity’s legal status defines the minimum legal standards we must
observe in our dealings with it. There is much disagreement over the point at
which an entity with full moral status comes into existence. Some argue that
moral status can be a matter of more or less; others that it is achieved at a moment
in time that cannot be defined.48 When there is reasonable disagreement over
whether an entity like the embryo has moral status, it may be granted legal status
as a matter of degree.49 Given the uncertainty surrounding issues of moral status,
it may be that the law simply draws lines at seemingly arbitrary points. Claims
that the law suggests that these points are morally special or that they constitute
bright lines on the moral spectrum are untrue and display a lack of un-
derstanding of law’s purpose. There is a distinction between when something
gains the law’s protection and when it has moral status. One should not
necessarily be understood as an offshoot of the other.50 When there is
disagreement over moral status, the law, in granting legal protection, is making
a statement about what is an acceptable way for people to behave given this
disagreement.
Finnis criticizes this approach to legal status.51 However, the account of
personhood that Finnis relies on is by no means uncontroversial or widely
accepted. He endorses an account of personhood that is reliant on the notion of
‘‘radical’’ capacities.52 Human embryos have the ‘‘radical’’ capacity for thought,
self-awareness, and so forth, even if they are not yet able to exercise that capacity.
According to Finnis, this sophisticated form of potentiality provides the basis
upon which the law’s protections should be afforded. He further states that
simply being a member of a species that generally has these capacities is
sufficient for moral status. He goes on to argue that pragmatism about legal
status like that endorsed by Roche and the Warnock Committee allows the law to
be misused by those in power—he uses an analogy with slavery. However, there
is a problem with trying to pin legal status to an account of moral status:
reasonable people will disagree over whether an entity has moral status or not.
Even Finnis himself is simply providing an account of features that he believes
can be justified as giving rise to moral status. Other accounts privilege
different features. The Roche court did not ignore the question of moral status;
rather, they acknowledged that there is no agreement as to whether embryos
have moral status. They had to decide whether the features of the embryo gave
rise to legal status notwithstanding the lack of consensus on the prior issue of
moral status.53
Sheelagh McGuinness and Sorcha Uı´ Chonnachtaigh
404
Concluding Thoughts on the Implications of Roche
By way of conclusion we wish to provide some brief thoughts on the implications
of the Roche decision for bioethical issues in Ireland. In the wake of Roche, the
permissibility of assisted reproductive technologies seems assured. Further, the
decision in this case seems to create scope for experimentation on embryos,
something that was considered impermissible prior to the case. Hardiman J.
(supported by Fennelly J.) made very strong policy-directed recommendations
regarding regulation (via legislation and a regulatory body) of AHR in Ireland.
Whether there will be government policy on this issue remains to be seen; the
controversial nature of the issues to be decided coupled with the current social
problems that have resulted from the recent recession create a lack of political
will on the part of government. What is clear as a result of this case is that AHR
and embryonic stem cell research are both possible without the prohibition on
abortion being lifted or indeed weakened. Many of the judges in this case were at
pains to make clear that the prohibition on abortion as set out in 40.3.3 remained
clear and would not be changed as a result of the judgment. Counterintuitively,
given the legal status of abortion, the abstraction of the embryo from the uterus is
seen as removing from it several layers of protection. It is quite unusual for
a constitution to give such strong protection to the in utero embryo while
simultaneously giving none to the in vitro embryo. The embryo is reliant on the
connection to the female body to gain the protection of the law. For example,
Denham J. focuses on ‘‘the equal right to life of the mother’’ set out in Article
40.3.3° as important for interpreting when the Article applies. The in vitro
embryo does not have a special relationship with the mother of the sort included
in the Article. On this basis, Denham J. held that the Article does not apply where
this relationship is not relevant (s.59). In Rochewe see that the role of the pregnant
woman underpinned the constitutional protection. The embryo’s connection to
the ‘‘maternal organism’’ gives rise to its capacity to be born,54 and it is this
characteristic that justifies its constitutional protection. The in vitro embryo
enjoys no such protection, and thus further legislation or regulation is required to
elucidate what may be done to and with it.
Notes
1. Roche v. Roche & Ors [2009] IESC 82 (hereafter Roche) was the Supreme Court appeal case. The first
High Court judgment was R v. R & Ors [2006] IEHC 221 (hereafter R) and the second High Court
judgment was MR v. TR & Ors [2006] IEHC 359 (hereafter MR).
2. Article 40.3.3 of the Irish Constitution.
3. See the recent decision in A, B and C v Ireland [2010] ECHR 2032.
4. There is no specific policy on assisted reproduction, although this was the subject of
a government-appointed commission that published policy recommendations in 2005, a year
before the MR v TR case came before the High Court. See the discussion of the regulative context,
including the medical guidelines and the recommendations of the Commission on Assisted
Human Reproduction in the section: Lack of Regulation in Ireland.
5. As per Hardiman J. in Roche; see note 1.
6. This is one of nine fertility treatment centers operational in the Republic of Ireland. None of these
centers have any specific regulation. Fertility clinics are regulated by the EU Tissue and Cells
Directive and Irish Medical Council Guidelines.
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